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Privatization, Prisons, Democracy, and
Human Rights: The Need to Extend the
Province of Administrative Law*
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
Administrative law has an important role to play when it comes to provid-
ing democratic forums for deliberation and decisionmaking on a wide range of
issues. In this paper, I will argue that domestic administrative law potentially of-
fers a means for addressing human rights problems arising from privatization,
particularly privatization in the United States dealing with prisons. As this
paper will argue, creating opportunities for citizen involvement in what other-
wise might be thought of as private decisionmaking processes may help prevent
human rights problems before they occur. At a minimum, such an approach can
create the forums and information necessary for meaningful and timely politics
to develop around issues that, once privatized, can all too easily fall from public
view. To make these arguments, this paper will focus exclusively on U.S. law as
a case study of these issues.
Administrative and regulatory law scholarship in the United States tradi-
tionally has involved the study of two key relationships: the relationship of the
individual to the state' and the relationship of markets to the state.2 The first
relationship-individuals and the state-involves analyses of the procedures
used by administrative agencies as they seek to carry out their substantive statu-
tory goals. As this paper will argue, analyses of the relative fairness, transpar-
ency, and public participation available to citizens in what many take for
*This article was originally published in Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globali-
sation (Koen De Feyter & Felipe G6mez Isa eds., 2005). It is republished here with permission.
**Roscoe C. O'Byrne Professor of Law, and Director, Institute for Advanced Study, Indiana
University-Bloomington. I wish to thank Professors Hannah Buxbaum, Carol Greenhouse,
Christiana Ochoa, and Elizabeth Zoller for their most helpful comments and suggestions. I also
wish to thank my research assistants, Aaron Furniss, class of 2004, and Helen Yu, class of 2006, for
their excellent work.
1. See HAROLD J. LASKI, THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY (2003).
2. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982).
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granted as wholly private domains is necessary. Administrative law now no
longer can remain state centric in its focus.
The second relationship-markets and the state-involves questions of the
appropriateness of state intervention in markets to encourage or mandate cer-
tain outcomes or behavior. The substance and the perceived legitimacy of the
law that develops from such interventions has had much to do with the proce-
dures that ultimately implemented it. Particularly when legislation has involved
ideological disagreements, continuing conflicts involving the legitimacy of the
laws passed by Congress often have been expressed procedurally.3 Procedures
and administrative structures have been substituted for alternative substantive
political compromises.4 Today, markets are often substituted as a means for
achieving public goals and resolving political disputes over how best to achieve
them. The fusion of the market and the state in many contexts also requires a re-
assessment of the principles and reach of traditional administrative law.
Administrative law in the United States traditionally has been conceptual-
ized in a state centric fashion-as a bridge between the market and the state.
These two realms-markets and states-have stood for very different worlds,
signaling binary approaches to obligations and constraints.5 Markets are said to
stand for private ordering as opposed to state regulation; free markets as opposed
to government bureaucracies.6 An important constitutionally based version of the
public-private distinction derives from these differences. The state action doctrine
is based on the explicit text of the Constitution imposing various restrictions on the
exercise of state power: "Congress shall make no law,"7 "1nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process. ' American ad-
ministrative law has followed these broad constitutional outlines. It was created
primarily for public bodies.9 Private actors and federal corporations have always
played an important role in the regulatory process, but the resort to the market in
3. For a case study of the use of procedure and administrative structures as a substitute for sub-
stantive legislative compromises, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Institutionalizing the Energy Crisis: Some
Structural and Procedural Lessons, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 493 (1980). See generally Paul R. Verkuil, The
Emerging Concept ofAdministrative Procedure, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 258 (1978).
4. See Aman,supra note 3. See generally Verkuil,supra note 3.
5. See SASKIA SASSEN, THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL (1988).
6. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
9. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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terms of regulatory approaches and structures has become increasingly common
and is now very much a part of the regulatory landscape.
Privatization and various forms of private ordering, in general, have become
more and more common as reforms, as we move from a focus on government to
a study of new conceptualizations of the processes of governance.'" Privatization
in the United States usually takes the form of giving over to the market the provi-
sion of services once provided by government." For example, prisons, welfare,
mental health facilities, and social services for the poor in general have all been
subjected to the reform ofprivatization. 2 The political decision to move a service
or governmental responsibility from the public side of the ledger to the private
side is consequential. It is, in effect, a decision to delegate governmental responsi-
bilities to the market, 3 or a claim that the activities involved were not appropriate
for governmental action in the first instance14 Privatization subjects the activity in
question to the forces of the market while freeing it from the various forms of
regulation-both substantive and procedural-that apply to public bodies. This
does not mean that no law applies; the common law and certain statutory laws
may apply. 5 Nevertheless, privatization of an industry or a social service usually
means the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 6 does not apply, nor does the
10. See THE TOOLS OF GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
11. See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 552-53
(2000). For a discussion of some of the differences between privatization in Europe and the United
States, see Giandomenico Majone, Paradoxes of Privatization and Deregulation, 4 EUR. PuB. POL'Y
53, 55 (1994).
12. See Patricia M. Wald, Looking Forward to the New Millennium: Social Previews to Legal
Change, 70 TEMp. L. REV. 1085, 1096-1100 (1997).
13. See Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, 115 HARv. L. REV. 1838, 1868-91 (2002).
14. See Richard J. Pierce, Reconsidering the Roles of Regulation and Competition in the Natural
Gas Industry, 97 HARV. L. REV. 345, 345 (1983); see, e.g., Edward W. Erickson et al., The Political
Economy of Crude Oil Price Controls, 18 NAT. RESOURCES J. 787, 800 (1978).
15. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 401-02 (1997).
16. The APA is a generic procedural statute passed in 1946 and intended to apply to many, if not
most, of the federal agencies at that time. It set forth the basics as far as administrative procedure
is concerned. It is premised on the idea that there are fundamental qualities that comprise what
administrative adjudication or rulemaking should look like, no matter what the substantive issue
may be or what agency may be involved. The APA has been supplanted by a variety of new sub-
stantive statutes in various specific areas, such as the environment, but I am using it primarily as a
short hand way of referencing the fundamental values of administrative law-transparency,
public participation, notice, a right to be heard, etc. Many of its procedural approaches remain
mmmm
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Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 7 More important, market incentives and
the profit motive may too easily be substituted for the public interest as well as for
primary markers of programmatic success." There may be a partial convergence
of market and public interest goals, as private actors strive to carry out their re-
sponsibilities in cost-effective and competitive ways.19 Without a ready flow of in-
formation about the substantive success of the regulatory missions involved, the
bottom line takes on more and more significance as a measure of success. Such
shifts in focus from public interest goals to the efficiencies of the market, coupled
with economic assessments of what constitutes success, coincide with some uses of
deregulation as well.2"
Global competition, and the drive for lower taxes and lower regulatory costs
that it encourages, accounts, in part, for the growth of what we might call a
"nonstate public sector." This sector is one that evades the administrative law
protections normally applied to a state entity, while bringing to bear the efficien-
cies of the market to the task at hand. Such approaches implicitly assume a zero-
sum public-private game-that is, as some matters are moved from the public to
the private sphere, nothing fundamental changes in what we think of as public
or as private. Markets are markets and the government is the government. If
anything, government can only be improved by the demands of the market, but
the two spheres remain relatively autonomous. Changes in technology or regu-
latory technique may favor one mode of regulation over another. Such change
may be innovative, but it need not be seen as transformative in nature if all that
changes is the relative degree of how much we now choose to make public and
how much we now leave to the private sphere.
highly relevant today, but many were also devised with essentially a New Deal conception of reg-
ulation involved. See Administrative Procedures Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (2005). 1 do not
argue that all of the APA's details remain relevant today, but rather that its core values and goals
do and should persist.
17. Like the APA, FOIA applies only to "state agencies."
18. For a discussion of some of the conflict ofinterest concerns presented by a merger of profit-
oriented approaches with public interest goals, see Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the De-
mocracy Problem in Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through Administrative Law,
28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477, 1481-83 (2001) (discussing legitimate and illegitimate forms of global
currency).
19. See VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE & NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RE-
SULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS (1993).
20. For example, there have been various deregulatory and market-based approaches to environ-
mental regulation. See generally Richard B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86 (1986).
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But this is not the case. It is not just the recourse to the market that makes such
change significant, but the change itself, located in the underlying relationship of
states to markets. It is the fundamental realignment in the way states and markets
interrelate and, at times, even merge-blurring and erasing the boundary be-
tween the two that requires us to examine these delegations to the market at the
domestic level as part of a larger picture.2' Several other forms of delegation of
state power are involved, including: (1) various "de facto delegations" to the mar-
ket that result from inadequate funding of the regulatory regime in place;22 (2)
delegations to private transnational entities, 23 whose regulation would most likely
require a multilateral approach, as well as (3) delegations to international organi-
zations such as the WTO 24 and (4) the devolution of federal responsibilities to
states or, in effect, delegations to subnational or regional entities.25 The cumulative
effect of all of these various delegations, especially privatization, amounts to a new
situation that requires that we see administrative law in a new light. The newly
enlarging private sphere is not the result of simply a shift of preference for the
private over the public, or the international over the national, but a new way of or-
ganizing public responsibilities and politics. Indeed, the cumulative impact of
these delegations (including the privatization of social services, the deregulation
of various industries, and the increased reliance on such public policy tools as
school vouchers, tax credits, and faith-based initiatives), in effect, privatizes the
public square, disaggregating the public and fusing concepts of citizenship with
26consumerism.
21. That larger picture is set forth, in detail, in ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT:
TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (2004).
22. Some agency budgets have declined or have not kept pace with increased demands. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Oppel, Official Says SEC Strained, With Duties Exceeding Budget, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 6,
2002, at C13 (The GAO warned that the SEC does not have financing to manage its growing
work load.). Enforcement activities in most agencies suffer from an inadequate staff. This puts
additional pressure on and creates incentives for administrators to promulgate rules that set goals
and standards whose enforcement is less labor intensive than command-control rules.
23. As Gunther Teubner argues, global law is made outside the political structures by private
transnational actors. See GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT A STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1996).
24. See Chantal Thomas, Constitutional Change and International Government, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 1
(2000).
25. See recent federalism cases discussed from a global perspective in Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Fed-
eralism Through a Global Lens: A Callfor Preferential Judicial Review, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.,
Winter 2004, at 109 (2004).
26. See MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: How AMERICA
SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC (2002).
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Such changes do not argue for a return to the past. Rather, they constitute
new regulatory and procedural questions that require new solutions. Some of
the new questions are: how best can nonstate actors be involved in decisionmak-
ing processes; 7 how can we maximize the flow of information involving thesedecisions;2" and how can we mitigate conflict of interest concerns that arise from
the fusion of public and private that typify many markets and market ap-proaches to policy issues--issues ranging from private prisons to welfare eligi-
bility.29 Fundamental issues of democracy are now at stake.3"
My argument is in four parts. In Part I, I discuss the democracy deficit. InPart II, I discuss two approaches to globalization-state centric and denational-
ized, or pluralistic. As I have indicated earlier,"' various delegations of statepower are important to the context I want to consider. In this paper, however, I
will consider only one of these. Part fIt will discuss intrastate delegations from
the public sector to the private sector, specifically, the privatization of prisons. I
conclude that what appears to be an ever-growing private sector-created bydelegations of public functions to private bodies (and international organiza-
tions as well)-is a crucial area for administrative law reform and an important
way of guarding against human rights violations.
For my discussion of the democracy deficit, I will take as a baseline fourgeneral criteria: the participation of affected stakeholders, notice of the actionsinvolved, transparency as to the outcomes and the reasons for those outcomes,
and accountability for these decisions. The types of delegations mentioned above
raise related democracy questions, but they embody different aspects of the de-
mocracy deficit in terms of these criteria. Shifts from the public sector to the
market displace key stakeholders from participation. Shifts from the state to theinternational arena preserve a role for the domestic public sector, but, often, in a
largely "rubber stamp" capacity.
27. In the context of the WTO, for example, see Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization's
Legitimacy Crisis, I WORLD TRADE REV. 7 (2002).
28. See id.
29. Regarding welfare, see Matthew Diller, The Revolution in Welfare Administration, 75 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1121 (2 0 0 0 ); on prisons, see Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons,supra note 13.30. For a discussion of the democracy issues involved in various global contexts, see Sympo-
sium, Globalization and Governance: Prospects For Democracy, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., Winter
2003, at 1-448.
31. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25. Portions of the text in Parts I, II, and III draw
upon my work in THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM,
supra note 21.
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These delegations also represent different aspects of globalization. How we
understand globalization will greatly affect our sense of the law reforms that
may be in order. Global processes intersect with state power in a variety of ways
that can be arrayed along a continuum from state centric to what I call denation-
alization.32 These dimensions of globalization involve different sorts of democ-
racy deficits and various potential roles for U.S. administrative law.
I. THE DEMOCRACY PROBLEM
The democracy problem in globalization arises from the disjunction be-
tween global economic processes (on the one hand) and local processes of demo-
cratic participation (on the other). By disjunction I refer to the exclusion of key
stakeholders (or stakeholder communities) from the institutional processes
whose outcomes affect them directly. When the resolution of such disjunctures
is left to domestic or transnational markets, or international organizations that
privilege market outcomes, such privatizations or market-oriented interna-
tional regimes only intensify the democracy problem.33 By approaching these
processes as if they were only unidimensional and subject either to the rules of
the market or the more traditional and hierarchical approaches of public law, we
simply reify the separate worlds of markets and states, without taking into ac-
count the ways globalization is changing these worlds and their relationship to
each other, and without providing room for a debate and discourse to develop
that include a meaningful politics involving noneconomic values. When regula-
tion is given over to the market or international decisionmakers, the public is no
longer involved directly in decisionmaking, nor is information usually available
in a form that would make public participation meaningful.34 Market outcomes
coupled with decisions not to act, or an inability to act, are often the result.
This results because globalization dramatically changes the way states and
markets interact, often fusing the public and private sectors in ways that can
evoke a form of neocorporatism when it comes to the ways states carry out their
32. See Jost Delbraick, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic
Law-A European Perspective, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9 (1993).
33. The state centric nature of U.S. public law makes this so.
34. For example, WTO decisionmaking processes are not transparent and participation beyond
the parties to the case is limited. See Esty, supra note 27.
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publicly mandated goals.3" Rather than procedures substituting for political
compromises over the substance of the underlying law involved, markets and
market approaches are now used. Procedural laissezfaire"6 is replaced with what,
to some, looks like substantive laissezfaire itself, but to others is simply the prag-
matic use of the market or, in effect, the reinvention of government.37 From a
pragmatic point of view, markets take the place of procedures as a way of avoid-
ing hard political choices. Markets and market approaches can cut costs in ways
that politically accountable officials usually wish to avoid. Privatization of some
governmental services may make it easier to cut budgets or eliminate unions."
Moreover, a preference for markets by politicians can signal not only an ideolog-
ical preference, but a kind of toughness as well. Markets can imply a degree of
harshness that appears to be neutral and simply the logical consequence of pro-
cesses over which we really have no individual control. For example, the idea of
bringing market processes to bear not only in the management of prisons or wel-
fare eligibility but, by implication, on prisoners and welfare recipients as well,
may resonate with a political goal of ensuring that certain individuals in society
do not benefit unduly at the public's expense.39 But such areas involve issues that
inevitably are political in nature and would benefit from public awareness of,
and input into, questions that focus not only on outcomes but the criteria used to
assess. For example, who is or is not eligible for welfare, or what kinds of pro-
cesses a private provider of prisons might or might not use for prisoners involved
in a disciplinary proceeding.
The intersection of markets and the domestic political goals of some offi-
cials, however, should not obscure the fact that there are other more fundamen-
tal political economic factors that illustrate the ways that global forces,
opportunities, and problems now influence the relationship of states and mar-
kets. Global competition affects states as well as the private sector. As govern-
mental entities at all levels vie for funds and investment into their enterprises,
low taxes and low-cost approaches to issues represent the currency with which
35. See generally ALAN CAWSON, CORPORATISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 22-46 (1986); ROBERT PER-
RUCCI, JAPANESE AUTO TRANSPLANTS IN THE HEARTLAND (1994).
36. See generally Aman, supra note 3; Verkuil, supra note 3.
37. See generally VICE PRESIDENT AL GORE & NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, COMMON SENSE
GOVERNMENT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS (1995).
38. See AMAN, supra note 21, at 152-53.
39. See generally Developments in the Law: The Law of Prisons, supra note 13 (discussing cost,
quality, and accountability in private prisons).
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they compete publicly. Market approaches are a part of the globally competitive
landscape now. Along with the economics of governing, there are also the new
realities of dealing with problems and actors that are global in scope. To be suc-
cessful, states must partner not only with other states but also with the private
sector. The interconnected nature of our economies, apart from the nonterrito-
rial nature of problems such as global warming and air pollution, requires
greater cooperation among states as well as a variety of new partnerships with
nonstate actors. This is necessary not only to solve problems but to take advan-
tage of opportunities as well."° The result is a number of important changes in
the ways current institutions, both domestic and international, state and non-
state, operate and interact with one another as well as a need for new under-
standings of the state's role in these activities." In this new context, public and
private do not necessarily mean the same thing, and markets cannot automati-
cally substitute more defined opportunities for democratic participation. Ad-
ministrative law cannot remain the same either. It must, like the global actors
and problems with which it deals, become multidimensional in its scope and
reach, particularly if it is to deal effectively with the democracy deficits gener-
ated by globalization.
A new, multidimensional domestic administrative law potentially offers
means for addressing the democracy deficits associated with globalization. The
multidimensional aspect of a new administrative law derives from the fact that
there is now both a public and a private dimension to lawmaking, and, in effect,
both a vertical and a horizontal aspect to governance. Yet, because the horizontal
aspects involve mostly private and nongovernmental entities, they are not, nor
should they always be, susceptible to the vertical and hierarchical aspects of gov-
ernment and law that typify traditional public law. At the same time, not to take
into account the decisionmaking and norm-creating powers of the private realm
leaves too many values hidden from public view, unknowable and unaccount-
able. As we shall see, to deal with both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of
40. For example, municipal services can be provided more efficiently if the service area is con-
ceptualized in optimal ways rather than on a territorial basis. See, e.g., Todd Wildermuth, Coun-
ties Consider Swapping Some Snow Removal Road Duties, TRINIDAD PLUS & THE RATON RANGE, Mar.
24, 1998 ("Certain roads in one county are more easily accessible from the neighboring county,
making it convenient and time-effective for the neighboring county's crews to handle snow re-
moval on those portions of road.").
41. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public!
Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769 (1998).
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global governance at the local level, and without automatically forcing them into
a hierarchical state mode of decisionmaking, the new administrative law will
have to be more focused on informational flows and democratic opportunities
for participation and persuasion, and less on the procedural control of hierarchi-
cal decisionmaking power. Its purpose will be less focused on carrying out the
goals of a particular regulatory regime, and more focused on how the informa-
tion and the politics necessary to create such a regime are made possible in the
first place. This will depend on the creation of the political spaces necessary to
raise important policy issues in a timely manner. In this sense, the new adminis-
trative law can draw on some of the procedural innovations that have occurred
in international law, another area of the law that must be deferential to various
power centers without being oblivious to them.42
The democracy problem generated by globalization in this broad sense is in-
creasingly a feature of modern life in the United States and abroad. A multidimen-
sional, domestic administrative law offers an alternate approach to the democracy
problem in at least some sectors of globalization. Commentators often refer to glo-
balization as if it were a new supranational order, somehow "beyond" or "over" the
sovereignty of individual states.43 I use the word "global" to refer to a transnational
public and its interests and stakes in globalization, and not to make a claim to some
universal interests. I see globalization as an open-ended set of dynamic and plural-
istic processes that combine public and private lawmaking in novel, hybrid forms.
My focus is on globalization at the domestic level-the domestic "face" of global-
ization, if you will-particularly where it involves the effects of delegations of state
power to private domestic actors, such as private providers of prisons.
II. STATE CENTRIC AND DENATIONALIZED ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION
The prevailing analysis of globalization is state centric in nature. This may
be because of what Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye refer to as the "Club
Model of Multilateral Cooperation," exclusively involving states and their repre-
sentatives for establishing rules and practices internationally.4" It may also be
42. See generally ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY 135-74
(1995).
43. See, e.g., MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE (2000); JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVER-
EIGNTY MATTERS 33-34 (1998).
44. See CLAUDE BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY 26 (2001) (discussing paper
given by Keohane developing idea of the club model).
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that the perception of globalization as a "thickening" of the international field
provokes a nationalist response that turns naturally to the state.4" To be sure, the
legal responses to global problems usually are the responses of states, often in the
form of multilateral treaties such as the Montreal Protocol on Ozone Depletion,
or the creation of international organizations such as the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO). Though the problems may be international in scope, the reme-
dies are usually local, and states play a significant role in their implementation.
But even in international organizations, or in the negotiations of multilateral
treaties, the individual sovereignties of states are, in effect, pooled. The outputs
of these treaty regimes and these international organizations are also, at least,
partially denationalized. The very nature of the compromises necessary for indi-
vidual states to engage in such multilateral forms of governance means that they
are not likely always to be able to pursue their own national interests exclusively,
or if they do, those interests usually are constructed with a more global sense of
the problems involved and of what will constitute an effective solution.
State centric approaches emphasize national perspectives. A state centric ap-
proach to globalization also usually means bright-line distinctions between the
public and the private sectors, and even more so, between domestic and interna-
tional law. In so doing, however, state centric approaches often fail to distinguish
between globalization and internationalization. They meet democracy concerns
through the mechanism of state representation in international or multinational
affairs. From a state centric perspective, multinational organizations (such as the
WTO) are viewed as extensions of the state, as if they were macro-federal struc-
tures. In addition to the limitations already noted, this federal analogy over-
emphasizes the distinction between state and nonstate actors, essentially
excluding the latter.46
Another aspect of globalization is denationalization. This term refers to
processes that are essentially deterritorialized and potentially independent of
states. This is especially true in the domains of economy, society, and culture.4 7
The denationalized aspects of globalization are highly dynamic processes that
are not determined by fixed jurisdictions or boundaries between countries. Con-
45. See, e.g., BENJAMIN BARBER, JIHAD VS. MCWORLD (1995) (discussing globalization and new
nationalisms).
46. Jost Delbrilck, Transnational Federalism: Problems and Prospects ofAllocating Public Authority
Beyond the State, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD., Winter 2004, at 31,49-50 (2004).
47. See SASKIA SASSEN, LOSING CONTROL? SOVEREIGNTY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION (1996).
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flating the global and the international neglects important differences between
them, and ignores important resources for simultaneously strengthening the ef-
fectiveness of international organizations and the relevance of democracy
among their member states. States thus remain highly relevant to our analysis;
however, the essence of globalization as denationalization is the recognition that
along with states, nonstate actors as well as international and supranational
bodies are all significant players. These networks amount to governance more
than government.
48
States alone cannot solve global problems or fully take advantage of global
market opportunities. As Phillipe C. Schmitter notes:
Governance is a method/mechanism for dealing with a broad
range of problems/conflicts in which actors regularly arrive at
mutually satisfactory and binding decisions by negotiating and
deliberating with each other and cooperating in the implementa-
tion of these decisions.
Its core rests on horizontal forms of interaction between actors...
sufficiently independent of each other so that neither can impose
a solution on the other and yet sufficiently interdependent so that
both would lose if no solution were found.49
The essence of such a conception of cooperation and the successful exercise
of power is that it depends less on hierarchy and more on the networks of actors
involved. For example, the state centric nature of the WTO's structure and the
legal power it wields are not inconsistent with a denationalized perspective on
globalization. The breadth and impact of its decisions create, foster, and encour-
age stakeholders other than territorially bounded actors such as states. This is es-
pecially true when the decisions involve nontariff barriers to trade such as
environmental laws. Indeed, a denationalized perspective makes broad-based
participation and a transparent decisionmaking process a natural part of any
48. DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 50
(1999).
49. PHILLIPE C. SCHMITTER, WHAT IS THERE TO LEGITIMIZE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION ... AND
How MIGHT THIS BE ACCOMPLISHED? 7, available at http://www.iue.it/SPS/People/Faculty/
CurrentProfessors/PDFFiles/SchmitterPDFfiles/LegitimizeEU.pd f (last visited Jan. 2001).
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institution that is global in its impact. The crosscutting relations among the is-
sues and the players require a process at least as broad as the impact of its out-
comes. This is the first among my democracy criteria, to which we will return
later.
A denationalized perspective on globalization highlights the need to em-
phasize networks and multiple decision sites and, if you will, a kind of global
pluralism. Pluralism does not mean relativism in this context, but rather a de-
centralized system of deliberative decisionmaking that is interconnected by at
least some common values and practices of legitimation. As a pluralist system,
globalization is theoretically open. Problems of pollution, for example, are not
bounded by territory, and even economic opportunities such as free trade in-
volve a conception of markets that is not, in theory at least, limited by state juris-
dictional lines.
The denationalized aspects of globalization are easily mistaken for state-
centered processes and thereby easily neglected as a domain for domestic law-
making and law reform. Because it is states doing the reacting to global issues or
drawing our fire for failing to react, it is easy to miss the fact that most global
processes are not at all state centered. The tendency to think in state centric
terms-to say something is either private or public, domestic or international-
cannot capture the complexity of global processes, the diversity of the global net-
works and players involved, and the decentered nature of the state when it does
react. There is in effect a gray zone that at present cannot be captured fully
either by states or (by default) by markets. This gray zone is of interest to me be-
cause it is in the areas where a more pluralistic, denationalized approach can be
instituted that administrative law comes into play. This is because state centric
approaches to globalization take the issue at hand outside the domestic arena, or
leave merely a rubber stamp. Most observers see globalization as essentially an
internationalfield comprised of states acting alone or together. However, I be-
lieve that viewing globalization instead as intersecting fields of transnational ac-
tors, both inside and outside the state sphere, yields both a richer understanding
of the processes involved and a fuller account of democratic possibilities.
Globalization means that states must partner with other actors, both state
and nonstate, if they are to solve problems that extend beyond their territorial
reach. This brings us to another aspect of globalization, one that I believe is more
telling in relation to the phenomena we tend to lump together under the rubric
of globalization. Whether the issue is environmental pollution or the most effi-
cient way of manufacturing and distributing automobiles, state jurisdictional
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lines are of ever-decreasing importance to the conceptualization and resolution
of the question at hand. This does not mean that states and national interests are
irrelevant. But it does mean that even when the externalities of globalization are
identified, states account for only some of the actors involved. Considering glo-
balization as denationalization facilitates understanding global lawmaking pro-
cesses as inherently pluralistic, involving multiple actors representing various
national and transnational networks.
With these different perceptions of globalization in mind, Part III now ex-
amines the delegations of public power to private entities in general, and then in
depth, the delegation of public power to private prisons.
III. DELEGATIONS TO THE MARKET
A. Privatization
Privatization should be understood as a principal dynamic (i.e., both cause
and effect) of globalization. It is not merely one means among many for making
government more efficient or for expanding the private sector. Nor is it just a re-
flection of current political trends and a swing of the regulatory pendulum from
liberal to conservative. Rather, the increasing reliance on "the new governance"
is indicative of a changing relationship between the market and the state. It is
characterized by a fusion of public and private values, rhetoric and approaches,
a fusion that is itself integral to the fusion of global and local economies. Privati-
zation is the result of these fusions. It, in effect, increases the exposure of the state
to external economic and political pressures that tend to accelerate globalization,
in large part, because private actors fully exposed to the global economy now
carry out the delegated tasks. The global political economy places great pres-
sures on all entities-public and private-to be cost effective if they wish to be
competitive. This encourages such delegations on the part of the state and it
raises concerns over whether the cost savings that result from such public dele-
gations to private entities occur at the expense of democratic processes, legiti-
macy, and individual justice. Given the role that the public-private distinction
plays in U.S. administrative law, privatization, in this global context, tends to re-
duce the democratic public sphere in favor of other arrangements that are likely
to be less transparent and accountable to the public, and less exposed to compet-
ing value regimes. This is the essence of the democracy deficit.
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The democracy deficit is primarily the result of the application of a tradi-
tional conception of the public-private distinction that will likely diminish the
public sector's responsibilities for transparency and accountability when private
actors perform certain tasks. Justifications often provided for such an approach
begin with the assumption that policymaking and administration can, in fact, be
separated-an assumption that most commentators reject. Even in privatized
contexts, private actors inevitably make policy when they carry out their dele-
gated tasks and interpret the contracts under which they operate. A new kind of
administrative law can and should be created to respond to the democracy defi-
cit associated with privatization. It need not rely solely on traditional procedural
approaches, arguably designed for governmental agencies carrying out regula-
tory functions. In fact, the role I envision for administrative law is not connected
to regulation per se, but to democracy. It is important to emphasize that what is
at stake are the values of public law-transparency, participation, fairness, and
accountability, as well as the kind of democracy that can flow from all of these
things. Various procedural approaches may be necessary to ensure the realiza-
tion of these values. It is the democracy-creating values of the APA, though not
necessarily the precise procedural devices it currently employs, that need to be
extended to various hybrid, public-private arrangements, if we are to ensure the
legitimacy of those partnerships.
The pragmatics of globalization make privatization one critical terrain in
which a new administrative law might respond by assuring public forums for
input and debate, and a flow of information that can help create meaningful pol-
itics around the decisions of private actors. The democracy problem is and
should be one of the primary concerns of the new administrative law. There are,
in effect, a variety of procedural responses possible to the procedural and struc-
tural questions presented by privatization. Perhaps the most common form of
response is what we can call a traditional labeling approach: the actions taken are
labeled either public or private. If public, a certain legal regime naturally follows
with the application of the Due Process Clause; if private, another set of pre-
ordained rules may apply, including common-law approaches.
There are many problems with the labeling approach, particularly as ap-
plied to social services for the poor. Even if traditional due process protections
extend to such contexts, the constitutional law that now exists may not be very
effective and, in most instances, courts are increasingly reluctant to intervene. In
any event, case-by-case approaches ignore the larger democratic needs that a
space for politics might provide. Quite apart from the individual issues of a case,
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there are the larger policy issues that a purely economic discourse may ignore.
However, if the private label is invoked, the resort to the common law, private
remedies, and regimes may also be insufficient to deal with the public aspects of
the problems involved. The emphasis is on suits based on retrospective facts, not
on public participation in the creation of prospective rules. More important, and
beyond what a private cause of action might provide, the problem with the label-
ing approaches is that they fail to recognize the reasons for the public-private
questions now being presented. Those reasons involve nothing less than the
transformative effect of the global economy on our legal system. There is now a
need to devise responses that are sufficiently flexible to meet the demands of a
world in which the relationship of markets to states is significantly different.
A new approach to administrative law is necessary-one that recognizes
that global forces are not linear and that their market outcomes are not inevi-
table. Rather, administrative law can be a means of resisting some aspects of glo-
balization while facilitating others. The public-private distinction need not be a
source or primary cause of a domestic democracy deficit if we are willing to ex-
pand the province of administrative law, at least to the point of covering private
actors carrying out public relationships. The following case study, dealing with
private prisons, shows how this might be accomplished.
B. Private Prisons
"Despite its contemporary ubiquity, the prison is a relatively recent fixture in
Western (indeed, every) society. Moreover, from the outset the prison was infused
with private ownership and control, and with private functions, in many respects
quite similar to the contemporary private prison."5 In the American colonial pe-
riod, there existed almost no prison structure, and incarceration was almost never
utilized for punishment.5 Where they existed, prisons were typically privately
run. The workhouse, an antecedent to the penitentiary, was established in 1555 in
England; these institutions (which worked prisoners and then charged them from
their labor earnings) were primarily private.52 In fact, "[t]he position of jailer itself
was sold from one individual to another." The workhouse was a form of invest-
50. Ahmed A. White, Rule of Law and the Limits of Sovereignty: The Private Prison in Jurispru-
dential Perspective, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 111, 122 (2001).
51. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 48-49 (1993).
52. See MARTIN P. SELLERS, THE HISTORY AND POLITICS OF PRIVATE PRISONS 48-49 (1993).
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ment." Until the U.S. Civil War, public prisons adopted various work require-
ments for prisoners, to the extent that many were self-sufficient and even declared
profits.54 Even with the introduction of the public penitentiary, the private sector
remained intertwined with the penal system; "[in the postbellum South, until at
least the 19 40s, the practice of substituting the plantation for the penitentiary con-
tinued in the guise of several different forced labor regimes."55 For example,
under the "criminal-surety" system, offenders convicted of minor crimes were al-
lowed to exchange future labor to private citizens in return for payments of fines. 6
California enacted a similar policy on an institutional scale: "the Prison Act of
1851 ... allowed prisoners to be turned over to contractors who would clothe,
feed, and detain them in return for their labor."57 In 1885, "13 states had contracts
with private enterprises to lease out prison labor."58 It was not until the start of the
twentieth century that it became the custom of correction agencies "to provide vir-
tually all correctional services as governmental functions in institutions con-
structed and maintained at the government's expense. 59
The move back to private prisons began with the expansion of private services
provided in prisons, which accelerated in the 19 60s. These newly private services
included "food preparation, vocational training, and inmate transportation."'6 The
first modern, privately operated prison was the Weaversville Intensive Treatment
Unit, opened in 1976 in Pennsylvania. 6' This facility was used for juveniles. Such
inmates continue to constitute a disproportionate share of the private facility popu-
lation. Currently, "more than 40,000 youth [are] now housed in privately operated
juvenile facilities."62 Private prisons initially were slow to expand the number of in-
mates under their control. In 1987, there were only 3,100 inmates in private correc-
tional facilities worldwide; in 1998, that number had risen to 132,000.63
53. See id. at 49 (citation omitted).
54. Seeid. at 50-51.
55. White, supra note 50, at 126.
56. Id. Often the convictions under these crimes were suspect to begin with, consisting of va-
grancy and trespass violations.
57. SELLERS, SUpra note 52, at 50.
58. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 10 (2001) (citation
omitted).
59. Id. at 11.
60. Id.
61. SELLERS, SUpra note 52, at 64.
62. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE,supra note 58, at 12.
63. Id. at iii.
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The predominant distribution of private prisons is in the South and South-
west, with almost no facilities existing in the East, Midwest, Upper Plains, or Pa-
cific Northwest.' This does not, however, mean that residents from these areas
are the most likely to be housed in private prisons; 4,000 Wisconsin prisoners are
housed out-of-state, and Hawaii only has one prison within its borders because
of high labor costs.
65
Use of private prisons in the United States has coincided with the widely
cited rapid growth of the number of inmates: "The population grew more than
400% from less than 320,000 in 1980 to nearly 1.4 million at the end of 2002. The
total population including those in jail was almost two million, with more than
1.8 million in state facilities. ' '66 For comparative purposes, the U.S. houses ap-
proximately 700 prisoners per 100,000 people, while Europe averages approxi-
mately 110 per 100,000.67
The United States having led the way, other nations have fol-
lowed. To date they are Australia (1990), England and Wales
(1992), Scotland (1997), New Zealand (1998), Canada (New Brun-
swick 1998), the Netherlands Antilles (1999), and South Africa
(1999). Australia has the greatest proportion of its prison popula-
tion in private prisons (about 20 percent); indeed, in one state, Vic-
toria, almost 50 percent of prison accommodation is private. Of
course, the numbers in Australia (ca. 4,000) are trivial by U.S.
standards. The other most-developed jurisdiction, the United
Kingdom, has about 10 percent of its inmates in private prisons.
68
C. Regulating Private Prisons: Toward a Model Statute
Statutes involving the privatization of prisons vary widely from state to state
in the protections they afford to the human rights of prisoners and the extent to
which they involve the public at large, in a timely way, in such issues. Because
64. Id. at 5.
65. White, supra note 50, at 139.
66. Robert P. Mosteller, New Dimensions in Sentencing Reform in the Twenty-First Century, 82
OR. L. REV. 1, 13 (2003) (citations omitted). This author notes, however, that the rate of growth in
America has drastically slowed.
67. Richard Harding, Private Prisons, 28 CRIME & JUST. 265, 269 (2002).
68. Id. at 268.
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"[miost government agencies have been satisfied with monitoring compliance
with the terms of the contracts, '"69 it is imperative that statutes include human
rights provisions that must be included in any private prison contract. Too often,
however, there is little, if any, guidance in the applicable privatizing legislation.
This is partly because decisions to privatize are often made hastily, usually in the
face of budget pressures or court orders to relieve overcrowding at public facilities.
Based on such realities, and given the presence of workable provisions scattered
throughout state statutes in the United States, this paper suggests the establish-
ment of a Model Privatization Code for prisons, incorporating many of these pro-
visions found across the country. It also analyzes a number of prison privatization
plans to illustrate why I believe they fall short of adequately protecting the general
public's right to participate in such discussions, as well as the human rights of pris-
oners. I will first discuss the cost assumptions underlying the privatization of
prisons. Next, I review prison services that can be privatized, but in ways that in-
volve the general public and retain the government's accountability for human
rights. Finally, I analyze the features of the criminal justice system that may in-
volve too great of a sacrifice of human rights values to justify privatization.
1. Privatization, Cost, Democracy, and Inequality
There is a continuing debate about whether private prisons offer any real cost
benefit at all. It is common, however, for some privatization statutes to require a
minimum-percentage cost savings from private prison operators.7" While it can be
argued that there would be little point in privatizing if some savings were not an-
ticipated, as the cost-savings requirement gets larger, there is an increasing danger
that private prisons would need to sacrifice prisoners' rights to meet the standard.
Contrary to popular wisdom, many states operate their own prison systems
incredibly frugally. Alabama's public prisons, for example, spend $1.08 per day to
feed each prisoner.7' It is hard to see how private companies would necessarily be
69. DOUGLAS C. McDONALD ET AL., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CURRENT PRACTICE (1998), available at http://www.abtassoc.com/reports/priv-report.pdf (last vis-
ited Apr. 7, 2005).
70. See, e.g., Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.510(13) (Banks-Baldwin 1998) (requiring at least 10%
savings); TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-104(c)(2)(B) (2002 Supp.) (requiring at least 5% savings); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. 9.06(A)(4) (West 2002) (requiring at least 5% savings); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 957.07
(West 2003 Supp.) (requiring at least 7% savings).
71. Carla Crowder, Alabama Feeds Prisoners on $1.08 a Day, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Nov. 26, 2003,
at A5.
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able to provide cost savings if the public authorities contract out for services such
as food services without the generation of ever greater human rights concerns.
There are many other areas where public prisons are already run very fru-
gally. In Alabama prisons, much of the work required to run the facility is per-
formed by prisoners, which drastically reduces the costs of operation. "Prisoners
chop wood, cut grass, grow vegetables, unload trucks, paint, sweep, mop and
staff the kitchen. When new prisoners arrive on buses, old-timers are there to or-
ganize paperwork, take photos, cut hair and assist in delousing."72 It is necessary
to ask in privatized industries what costs have the legislators, in their statute, al-
lowed to be lowered by the private entities, and what is the likely effect of the
freedom given private companies in those provisions.
The Colorado privatization statute explicitly allows private providers to ad-
just worker wages and benefits: "[t]he general assembly recognizes that such
contracting may result in variances from legislatively mandated pay scales and
other employment practices that apply to the state personnel system." 73 In con-
trast, Washington, D.C. requires a private provider to offer displaced workers a
right of first refusal for jobs with the private company, and further requires that
private companies comply with the government pay scale for six months. 74 The
D.C. statute restricts a private provider's ability to meet cost targets by hiring
more efficient workers or changing incentive structures; any required efficiency
gains must, therefore, come from the reduction of other costs. The Colorado
statute, like many others, requires that "privatization of government services not
result in diminished quality in order to save money.
75
When privatizing prisons, however, an important question is from whose
perspective is "quality" measured. Unless prison contracts entered into under
the statute contain verifiable measures of quality, such statutory terms are, in all
likelihood, unenforceable. With a few exceptions, states in the United States do
a poor job of specifying what the state desires (besides low cost) to get for its
agreement to employ a private prison provider. Michigan, in its statute allowing
the privatization of juvenile-correction facilities, mandates that private provid-
ers of prisons require prisoners without high school degrees to receive a general
72. Id.
73. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50-501 (West 2003).
74. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-301.05b(d)(2)-(4) (2003).
75. § 24-50-501.
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equivalency diploma (GED).76 Colorado requires that private providers guaran-
tee education services (and other services including dental, medical, psychologi-
cal, diet, and work programs) of quality at least as high as public prisons.77 The
problem with Colorado's provision is that it does not provide any specific, con-
crete standards by which a comparison of quality can be judged.
Part of the reason for concern about the potential for human rights abuses in
private prisons is that the major rationales for the "relatively strong relationship
between democratic forms of government and the protection of human rights""
break down in the prison context. This means that most activities that would not
require government retention of responsibility in other settings (such as the pro-
vision of food services in government buildings) might require such attention in
the prison context. By democracy, I refer not only to electoral democracy, but the
kinds of microdemocracies that administrative law can help create by providing
for a steady flow of information and public participation in privatization discus-
sions. The dialogue such transparency can inspire places an emphasis on bar-
gaining and compromise to resolve disputes, one that helps to further the human
rights of citizens.79 Additionally, information about private prisons can affect
elections. It is argued that "democracies offer their citizens the ability to remove
potentially abusive leaders before violations have become too severe."8 Further-
more, "the civil liberties usually associated with democracies ... enable citizens
and opposition groups to publicize government abuses."'" These arguments lose
their force in the prison context, where a defined minority of the population is
stripped of both civil liberties and, often, the right to vote; prisoners are therefore
excluded from the bargaining necessary to prevent oppression, and, especially in
a privatized context, the general public usually is excluded from regular infor-
mation about the treatment of inmates at prisons. Publicly-available informa-
tion about cost and the contractual provisions is likely to replace a broader,
political discourse in a privatized setting.
Publicity is hard to come by. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that neither
the press nor the public has a constitutional right of access to prisons. In Houchi'ns
76. See MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 79 1.2 20g(l 1) (West 2001).
77. See CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-202(0 (West 2003).
78. Wesley T. Miller, Economic Globalization and Rights: An Empirical Analysis, in GLOBALIZA-
TION AND HUMAN RIGHTs 77, 83 (Alison Brysk ed., 2002).
79. See id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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v. KQED,"2 a media plaintiff sought access to the wing of a county jail where a
prisoner had committed suicide. The jail's condition allegedly caused the in-
mate's suicidal depression. At the time KQED commenced its suit, the prison
did not conduct private tours, the inmates' mail was censored, and no interviews
with inmates were permitted of any kind. KQED argued that the county's fail-
ure to provide adequate means for the public to become informed about the con-
ditions of the jail violated the First Amendment.
The Court's plurality opinion, authored by Chief Justice Burger, noted that
the Court in previous cases (also dealing with access to prisons)8 3 rejected a spe-
cial right of access for the press beyond that afforded to the public in general.
The Court further held that there was no discernible basis for a constitutionally
imposed governmental duty to disclose newsworthy information. 4 Chief Justice
Burger concluded that the First Amendment did not mandate a right of access
to information within the government's control.85 The Court's opinion would
apply, most likely, with at least equal force to private prisons; Burger stated that
"[t]here is an undoubted right to gather news 'from any source by means within
the law,' but that affords no basis for the claim that the First Amendment com-
pels others-private persons or governments-to supply information."
86
2. Minorities in Prison
No thorough discussion of human rights issues in connection with U.S. pris-
ons can be complete without some mention of the disparate representation of
minorities in the U.S. legal system. A discussion of one state, Alabama, with a
significant private prison population is instructive. The "clientele" of many pri-
vate prisons is likely to be disproportionately minority; in Alabama, 73 percent
of felony defendants are minorities.8 7 While Black males are much more likely
to be subjected to prison time, and therefore have to live in a private prison, they
are also correspondingly less able to influence either any privatization decision
or any oversight protocols. It might be expected, for instance, that Blacks at
82. 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
83. See id. at II (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1973) and Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 850 (1973)).
84. See id. at 11-12.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
87. AM. BAR Ass'N, JUSTICE IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE 21ST CENTURY JU-
DICIARY 43 (2003).
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high-level judicial positions would be able to influence somewhat the direction
of the state's prison system. Yet despite Blacks' constituting 26 percent of Ala-
bama's population, there is not a single African-American on any of Alabama's
three appellate courts: the Alabama Supreme Court, the Alabama Court of Civil
Appeals, and the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals.8" Not only are African-
Americans underrepresented in positions of power within the judicial system,
but currently over 30 percent of Black males in Alabama have lost the right to
vote because of felony convictions, and "[t]he projection is that by the year 2005
the number could be as high as 40 percent. '"89 Alabama is not alone in its high
disenfranchisement rate for African-American males; there are "more than
600,000 [disenfranchised felons] in Florida, not including those still in prison, on
parole or on probation. More than one in four black men here may not vote.
''
D. Private Prisons- Transparency and Accountability
Even if adequate democratic checks existed for prison privatization deci-
sions, most states do not subject providers to enough oversight to ensure ac-
countability for human rights protection. States take numerous approaches to
the privatization issue, subjecting private service providers to differing degrees
of public accountability. Most states have statutes regarding the privatization of
prisons, some allowing and encouraging them, some banning their use alto-
gether.9' A number of states also have general privatization statutes covering the
privatization of any services. These general statutes reflect a variety of views to-
ward privatization. For example, Colorado's privatization statute provides that
"it is... the policy of this state to encourage the use of private contractors for
personal services to achieve increased efficiency in the delivery of government
services."92 At the other end of the spectrum, the Massachusetts' privatization
statute states that the legislature "hereby finds and declares that using private
contractors to provide public services formerly provided by state employees does
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. Abby Goodhough, Disenfranchised Florida Felons Struggle to Regain Their Rights, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 28, 2004, at Al.
91. See, e.g., N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 72(1) (McKinney 2003) (requiring the department to main-
tain custody of all inmates); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-50-106(a) (Michie 2002) (authorizing contracts
for construction, financing, and operating facilities).
92. CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-50-501 (West 2003).
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not always promote the public interest."93 The danger of statutes like Colorado's
is that they state as fact the contentious issue of whether private providers are in
fact more efficient; the statute assumes that private companies would more effi-
ciently provide any service. This statute operates as a presumption that privati-
zation is in the public interest, which may stifle debate on the actual merits of
any individual privatization decision.
In order for a government to retain legitimate accountability for private
prisons:
The state must retain and be able actually to exercise "step-in"
rights-that is, to reclaim any privatized part of its prison system-
and to do this it needs to have ongoing capacity and skill levels of its
own. This can only be done if it remains a direct service provider in
relation to some part, at least, of its prisoner population.
94
For some services, such as janitorial services, the ability to "step-in" would
not require the retention of a pool of state workers, even if such services were
deemed to be a high human rights priority. For positions such as prison guards,
in contrast, the state would have to retain a pool of public guards. Otherwise, if
human rights problems developed at a private facility because of inadequate
training, the state could not step-in with workers to take over security provision,
and the state would likely have also lost the institutional ability even to train
workers to perform the duties of a prison guard. In both 1982 and 1997 the Ten-
nessee legislature considered, and rejected, proposals to privatize the state's en-
tire prison system.95 The Correctional Corporation of America (CCA) promised
the state that it would be able to save $100 million per year with a completely
privatized system. Not only would a state lose the ability to step-in if it accepted
such a proposal, but if the private provider was really able to save such a large
sum of money, it would be difficult to see how a state would be able to quickly
take back a prison system. States have shown a propensity to spend or return in
tax cuts any surplus money, and Tennessee, as a midsized state, would be hard-
pressed to come up with the money necessary to pay for the re-establishment of
a public prison system in the event the private provider was unsatisfactory. The
93. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 7, § 52 (West 2003).
94. Harding, supra note 67, at 282.
95. See id. at 281-82.
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ability of a state to step-in can be ensured, at least in part, through a "contestabil-
ity" process where public providers are able to bid against private providers for
contracts. Such a procedure, however, risks the removal of a governmental
check on the dominance of economic concerns over human rights issues, insofar
as the public providers are subjected to the same dominance of economic issues
over noneconomic values in the provision of services.
"Even though there exist over a hundred privately operated secure confine-
ment facilities [in the United States], there have been very few systematic at-
tempts to compare their performance to that of public facilities. Most
government agencies have been satisfied with monitoring compliance with the
terms of the contracts."96 The fact that most government oversight of private
prisons concerns the monitoring of contract terms necessitates the inclusion of
human rights provisions in privatization contracts. This is especially true given
the increasing judicial indifference in the United States to prisoner suits,97
though the Supreme Court has recognized that private prisons and their em-
ployees are less immune from suit than their public sector counterparts.
98
One way to increase the accountability of private prison operators to the state,
and thereby ensure that the state retains ultimate responsibility for prisons, is to
limit the length of the privatization contract. The Supreme Court recognized this
form of accountability in Richardson v. McKnight, where a Tennessee statute lim-
ited a contract's term to three years. The majority stated that the firm's "perfor-
mance is disciplined ... by pressure from potentially competing firms who can try
to take its place." 99 Many states, however, do not specify a maximum contract
length; some statutes explicitly allow for long-term contracts. Arkansas, for ex-
ample, states that contracts with private prisons "may be entered into for a period
of up to twenty (20) years."'0 0 On the other end of the spectrum, Ohio provides that
a contract "shall be for an initial term of not more than two years, with an option
to renew for additional periods of two years.'' Shorter contracts increase the po-
96. DouGLAs C. McDONALD ET AL., PRIVATE PRISONS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CURRENT PRACTICE 54 (1998), available at http://www.abtassoc.com/reports/priv-report.pdf (last
visited Feb.17, 2004).
97. See Harding, supra note 67, at 308.
98. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997) (holding that private prison guards do not
enjoy the qualified immunity in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 cases that public prison guards do).
99. Id. at 410.
100. ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-50-106(d) (Michie 2002).
101. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 9.06(A)(1) (West 2002).
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.
tential frequency of public input into the process, which would ideally be encour-
aged before contract renewal takes place.
A problem with the Court's praise of the short term provided by Tennessee
law is that the Court assumed that there would be a number of firms available if
the private provider should fall short in its performance. Whether there is any
real competitiveness in the privatized-prison industry, however, is questionable
because of its oligopolistic nature. As of December 31, 1998, over 76 percent of
the private prison capacity was controlled by just two companies: Wackenhut
Corrections Corporation (WCC) and CCA,0 2 and CCA is a former subsidiary of
WCC. 1°3 When states privatize, they must realize that the benefits of any market-
like effects are concentrated in the period before a contract is entered. "The
distinctive feature of contracting out is the element of ex ante competition-
competitionfor the market as opposed to competition in it."" 4 The imposition of
long-term contracts between states and prison providers is likely to further con-
centrate the industry, by providing fewer opportunities for new companies to
enter a market with a very limited number of potential customers.
In addition to the accountability-increasing feature of having a short potential
contract period, Tennessee also provides that any private prison "must agree that
the state may cancel the contract at any time after the first year of operation, with-
out penalty to the state, upon giving ninety (90) days' written notice."'0 5 This pro-
vision encourages the state to oversee the running of any private prison more
closely, because the delegation can easily be reconsidered. Private groups who are
interested in the privatization of prisons also have an incentive to monitor the pri-
vate provider more closely, because at any time after the first year they can lobby
the state to rescind the contract if it becomes apparent that a different provider
(either public or private) would be preferable. All privatization contracts that rep-
resent the possibility of significant infringements upon human rights should con-
tain a provision allowing the state to cancel the contract if the state believes that
human rights abuses may be occurring at a facility without fearing that the private
provider might be able to hold the state liable for breach of contract. Clearly,
102. See JAMES AUSTIN & GARRY COVENTRY, EMERGING ISSUES ON PRIVATIZED PRISONS 4 (2001).
103. Stephen Pounds, Prison Operator Makes Corrections to Expand, PALM BEACH POST, Aug. 24,
2003, at IF.
104. Simon Domberger & Paul Jensen, Contracting Out by the Public Sector: Theory, Evidence,
Prospects, OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y, Winter 1997, at 67, 68 (1997).
105. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-104(a)(4) (2003).
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prison guards have an important enough role to qualify-I would argue that
medical providers do, as well. By contrast, janitorial and secretarial services would
fit within the category of services that may be fully privatized.
Another important factor in retaining government responsibility for human
rights abuses is the political accountability of the entity that actually makes the
contract to privatize and what involvement other actors have in this process. To
the extent that contracts become immutable, often even to later legislatures, and
to the extent that, as mentioned above, states for the most part stick to contractual
issues when policing private prisons, it is important that the participation of the
public and the public's representatives be maximized as early in the process as pos-
sible. Tennessee's statute provides a complex contract-approval procedure involv-
ing several individuals and entities, but makes no provisions for the input of the
general public. 0 6 Any contract must be approved by the state building commis-
sion, the attorney general, and the commissioner of correction.0 7 Additionally, all
proposals are reviewed by two congressional committees, which can make com-
ments to those responsible for approving contracts before such approval takes
place. ' 8 All approved and proposed contracts are sent to the state and local gov-
ernment committees of both the senate and the house.0 9 While this procedure in-
volves various members of the legislative and executive branch, it does not provide
direct opportunities for the public in general to affect these officials' decisions.
Nevertheless, at least the privatization procedure involves members of both the
executive and legislative branches and includes legislators themselves, who are
often very accessible to public input. In Idaho, the decision to enter into a contract
with a private prison provider is left solely to the state board of correction; 1" ° most
of the public would not know whom to contact to affect privatization contracts or
whom to hold accountable for the decisions of the board.
While several privatization statutes, such as Tennessee's, provide for some
participation from the legislative branch in the contracting phase, few suggest
any method for direct involvement from the public. One of the only states to call
specifically for a public hearing does so in a statute covering all forms of govern-
ment privatization. Montana requires an agency to form a privatization plan be-
fore any program can be privatized. Additionally the state provides that:
106. § 41-24-104.
107. § 41-24-104(a)(1).
108. § 41-24-104(a)(2)(A).
109. § 41-24-104(a)(2)(B).
110. See IDAHO CODE § 20-241 A (Michie 1997).
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The privatization plan must be released to the public and any
affected employee organizations and must be submitted to the
legislative audit committee at least 90 days prior to the proposed
implementation date. At least 60 days prior to the proposed im-
plementation date, the legislative audit committee shall conduct a
public hearing on the proposed privatization plan at which public
comments and testimony must be received. At least 15 days prior
to the proposed implementation date, the legislative audit com-
mittee shall release to the public a summary of the results of the
hearing, including any recommendations of the committee relat-
ing to the proposed privatization plan."'
Florida "require[s] public sessions of the Correctional Privatization Commis-
sion to be held at which contract variations are [not only] discussed[, they are also]
explained.""..2 Public hearings produce little benefit, however, if the public is not
provided with adequate information with which to make informed suggestions.
Kentucky law requires the production of information necessary for the public to
make informed decisions about the quality and value of privatized services:
The private provider shall develop and implement a plan for the
dissemination of information about the adult correctional facility
to the public, government agencies, and the media. The plan shall
be made available to all persons. All documents and records, ex-
cept financial records, maintained by the private provider shall be
deemed public records.
13
Kentucky does not rely solely on voluntary disclosure by the provider to
amass information on the functioning of privatized prisons. The legislature has
also required that "[t]he department shall annually conduct a performance eval-
uation of any adult correctional facility for which a private provider has con-
tracted to operate. The department shall make a written report of its findings
and submit this report along with any recommendations to the private provider
and the Legislative Research Commission."".4 The prison privatization provi-
111. MONT. STAT. ANN. § 2-8-302 (2002).
112. Harding, supra note 67, at 308.
113. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 197.510(7)(Michie 1998).
114. § 197.515.
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sions create a large quantity of data, and attempt to transmit most of the data to
the public. They do not, however, provide any mechanism for the public to par-
ticipate in the privatization decision, do not limit the length of any contract, and
do not contain many concrete requirements for the actual running of the prisons-
all of which would be necessary for meaningful accountability.
Most U.S. prison privatization statutes require certification by the American
Correctional Association (ACA). As Richard Harding notes, however, "[i]mpor-
tant as [ACA] standards are in maintaining a level of accountability in U.S. cor-
rections, they are primarily processual and formulaic. Practical, on-the-ground
compliance or breach is seldom clear-cut, yet clarity and predictability are crucial
for accountability.""11 Requiring certification, therefore, cannot absolve a state
from responsibility for prison services touching on basic human rights such as
prisoner safety. The United Kingdom and Australia do not require accreditation;
the U.K system instead relies upon government prison inspections:
[t]he primary source of information, in contrast to ACA accredita-
tion processes [where the ACA spends most of its time during an-
nounced visits reviewing a prison's written procedures], is direct
observation, discussions with prisoners and staff, participation in
some programs, follow-up interrogation of management, all this
fortified with detailed scrutiny of documentation and records.116
By using government inspectors, the United Kingdom also maintains direct
public oversight of prison conditions, a necessary element in preserving prisoner
rights. Additionally, the United Kingdom-as well as Australia, Canada, and
New Zealand-grant prisoners access to an ombudsman to whom prisoners can
complain about violations of human rights by private prison providers. No such
system is found in most U.S. systems." 7
Statutes that clearly specify required elements of any prison privatization
contract are preferable to those that establish few (or no) concrete requirements
of the private entity in such contracts. In contrast to contract provisions, statu-
tory language is readily accessible to the public; almost all of a state's statutory
115. See Harding, supra note 67, at 303.
116. Id. at 318.
117. See id. at 319.
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law can be located, free of charge, through the state's homepage."8 Additionally,
even if the public cannot comment, legislative sessions are often open for the at-
tendance of interested individuals. The Colorado General Assembly website al-
lows the public to listen to the proceedings in the state house and senate, even
including committee meetings."9 Furthermore, incorporating contract terms
into a statute allows interested groups to focus their efforts on the design of every
privatization contract in the state. Trying to influence each contract individually
(even if the group would be notified before a contract was finalized) might often
prove to be too taxing on an interested group's or individual's resources. Finally,
legislatures are directly accountable to the public through elections, while enti-
ties such as state corrections boards are not.
In establishing a Model Privatization Code, it would be important to set up
the basic requirements for ensuring that human rights are protected while leaving
ample room for state experimentation with different procedures for enhancing
the performance of private prisons. It is important to recognize that the current
levels of privatization are unprecedented, and states may develop many insightful
provisions to enhance the effectiveness of private prisons. Establishing a uniform
code might actually aid such innovation, by enabling legislators to spend less time
working out the basics of privatizing legislation, and, therefore, allowing consid-
eration of state-specific (and other) concerns. Without some sort of guide for leg-
islatures there is also the danger that the large private prison companies will be
successful in establishing a uniform statute that represents primarily only their in-
terests. Because, as mentioned above, many privatization decisions often seem to
be made hastily by states, there is a danger that legislatures might pass such legis-
lation without adequate consideration of human rights issues.
The private prison industry leaders are CCA, which has approxi-
mately 55 percent of the U.S. business, and WCC, with about 22
percent. Each also operates in non-U.S. markets through subsid-
iary companies that are usually "$2 companies" formally incorpo-
rated but not capitalized in the local jurisdiction. In those
118. See, e.g., Colorado General Assembly Home Page, at http://www.leg.state.co.us (last visited
Apr. 7, 2005); State of Arizona Home Page, at http://az.gov/webapp/portal (last visited Apr. 7,
2005).
119. See Colorado General Assembly Home Page, supra note 118.
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markets, WCC has 54 percent of the business, CCA 14 percent,
and the British/Swedish Group 4 consortium 28 percent. 20
This foreign ownership matters for several reasons. First of all, to the extent
that international law holds private companies responsible for human rights
abuses, such responsibility is greatly muted when underfunded subsidiaries are
responsible for the complained-of practices. Additionally, "prison management
is not simply a generic skill applicable anywhere on the globe but one that is to a
significant degree culture specific.' 121 In the context of human rights, this means
that foreign prison management is potentially at a greater risk of violating
human rights because of an inability to interpret cultural signals in an institu-
tional context that is insulated from the host's society at-large.
E. The Outer Limits of Privatization and Prisons
1. Disciplinary Hearings
One of the inherent human rights problems created by the privatization of
prisons is the blurred line between inmate discipline and the administering of ad-
ditional prisoner punishment. Obviously, in order to run a prison effectively, the
private provider must be able to assert some form of authority without clearance
from a public supervisor. There is a point, however, where the discipline exacted
by a private prison crosses over into punishment, and constitutional due process
concerns require public oversight. In the United States many "disciplinary func-
tions for breach of prison rules are carried out directly by the private operator." '122
In most U.S. jurisdictions inmates can receive time off their prison sentences for
"good time" served; in other words, a prisoner's sentence is reduced for behaving
well behind bars. While public prisons often have an incentive to credit prisoners
for "good time" because of prison overcrowding, private prisons often have the
opposite incentive because they are usually paid according to their daily occu-
pancy. Guards at CCA facilities are given the option to buy company stock, and
therefore "have a vested interest in maintaining high occupancy for a protracted
period of time."'123
120. See Harding, supra note 67, at 314-315.
121. Id. at 315.
122. Id. at 276.
123. MICHAEL WELCH, PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA: SOCIAL CONTROL AND THE IRONIES OF IMPRISON-
MENT 291 (1999).
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These incentives have produced obvious results. "The New Mexico Correc-
tions Department found that inmates at the [state's] CCA facility lost 'good time'
eight times more frequently than prisoners in a state institution."' The revoca-
tion of "good time" amounts to a deprivation of liberty significant enough to re-
quire an action by the state. The United Kingdom retains state control over
disciplinary matters: "[iun all private prisons, disciplinary charges laid by custo-
dial officers are adjudicated by. . . public sector officials who work on-site."'
125
Another prison procedure that should be subject to public official control is the
imposition of administrative segregation. "In Tennessee, CCA guards say pri-
vately that they are encouraged to send balky inmates to administrative segrega-
tion; by placing prisoners in the 'hole,' the company earns an extra $1,000
because 30 days are added to the sentence.
'126
2. Exporting Inmates
In the United States, it is now common for inmates to be shipped to private
prisons in other states, in an effort to find the lowest cost provider. "These ar-
rangements are not only inimical to prisoners' best interests in terms of family
visits, but they also stretch the chain of accountability beyond breaking point.
The state of origin of the prisoners has no standing to regulate or supervise what
happens within the private prison."' 27 These transfers are often to distant states,
increasing the "accountability deficit" created by these arrangements. For ex-
ample, two of the largest prisoner-exporting states are the only two not within
the contiguous forty-eight: Hawaii sends prisoners to Minnesota, and Alaska
sends prisoners to Arizona. 2' Another reason to develop a Model Privatization
Code is that states often fail to consider all of the possible scenarios in which the
switch to private prisons affects the status of the prisoners. For instance, when
Oregon sex offenders housed in a Texas prison escaped in 1998, Texas officials
were not even informed that they were housing these prisoners and "could not
charge them with escape because in Texas it was not yet a crime to flee a private
corporation."'129 CCA stated that "they had no legal obligation to notify city or
124. Id.
125. Harding, supra note 67, at 276 (citation omitted).
126. WELCH, supra note 123, at 291 (citation omitted).
127. Harding, supra note 67, at 280.
128. Id.
129. WELcH,supra note 123, at 289.
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county officials" of the transportation of sex offenders to their jurisdiction. 3 '
This lack of information on the part of host states arguably violates a right to in-
formation on the part of citizens of the host state, who deserve to know potential
risks to which they might be exposed because of private inmates. While such a
lack of information might occur in prisons housing in-state offenders, the risks
are greatly reduced.
Much of the pressure to privatize prisons is driven by cost. While every state
has seen a dramatic increase in incarceration levels, Arizona's prison population
has had increases of almost 1,000 percent in the last twenty-five years.'3 ' The
state is also facing a $1.3 billion budget shortfall, leading to massive jail over-
crowding. "The state's prisons are built to hold 26,000 inmates. They now hold
more than 30,000." 1"32 In the face of budget shortfalls, legislators are reluctant to
spend money on prison construction, and this reluctance translates into a de
facto ceding of increasing proportions of inmate housing to private facilities.
One issue of growing national concern-but of greater effect in Arizona-is the
housing of increasing numbers of foreign national prisoners. About 10 percent
of Arizona's prisoners are Mexican nationals, and state officials have estimated
that housing prisoners in Mexico could possibly save over $8,000 per inmate each
year. 133 Arizona's senate in 2003 rejected a bill that "would have required the
state to seek proposals from private prison operators to build and operate a
prison within the neighboring Mexican state of Sonora."'34 This issue has been
discussed in Arizona for several years, however, and it is likely that it or another
state with high numbers of Mexican nationals (such as New Mexico) will exper-
iment with a cross-border facility in the future.
Even more worrying is the emerging trend in the U.S. of "bed brokering,"
where private companies (such as Inmate Placement Services) find a prison bed
in another state to house prisoners whom the home state cannot place.'35 With
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131. See Robert Nelson, Big House Inc.: Think More Private Prisons Would Be Good for Arizona?
Think Again, Sucker, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Apr. 3,2003, at A5.
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Few Out, PHOENIx NEW TIMES, Oct. 23, 2003, at A8.
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June 17, 1997, at 8.
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private prisons responsible for small numbers of inmates from numerous states,
there is a danger that no individual state will have enough incentive to properly
oversee human rights compliance, especially where the housing state does not
send any of its own prisoners to the facility. Consequently, states should be re-
quired to house, and therefore retain responsibility for, their own prisoners.
In order to protect human rights, a state must also prohibit private provid-
ers, who either house inmates in the state or accept inmates from the state within
facilities found in other states, from lobbying the state on criminal sentencing
laws. It is true that private corporations can be more cost sensitive than public
entities because of their accountability to shareholders. There is no evidence that
private providers attempt to either influence sentencing decisions or statute
drafting in order to increase the number of prisoners, thereby increasing their
potential "clients." However, as private prisons begin to saturate markets and
deepen their relationships with state legislators, prudent drafting should require
that all prison privatization statutes make clear that contracting prisons are pro-
hibited from lobbying the legislature on criminal-sentencing matters. Richard
Harding has correctly stated the danger:
[R]egulatory mechanisms in relation to private prisons are more
susceptible to capture-that is, a situation where "regulators
come to be more concerned to serve the interests of the industry
with which they are in regular contact than the more remote and
abstract public interest"-than in relation to other, more strictly
commercial activities.1
36
It is, consequently, more important for the legislature to circumscribe the
administering agency's discretion more than in other privatization contexts.
3. Privatization of Interrogation During Wartime
Privatization and the conduct of war, particularly the war in Iraq, has been a
topic of great concern.'37 Consider the current controversy surrounding Iraq and
the Abu Ghraib prison. The Abu Ghraib scandal involves directly the problems
that arise with the privatization of prisons, particularly with respect to human
136. Id. at 306 (citation omitted).
137. See generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY IN-
DUSTRY (2004).
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rights. When a government contracts for the regulation and administration of pris-
ons without adequate limitations concerning what actions are acceptable, and what
are beyond the scope of reason (and perhaps even unlawful), and what treaties,
laws, and regulations apply, the propensity for abuse can increase considerably.
When the Abu Ghraib scandal came into the media spotlight last year, a
connection between prison regulation and private firm involvement also became
apparent. As noted earlier in the paper, hiring private companies to handle gen-
eral duties or tasks in the prison system is a fairly common practice; however,
relegating the types of duties that were contracted out at Abu Ghraib is outside
the scope of those general duties, and, as with disciplinary proceedings and the
export of prisoners, raises a serious question of whether the interrogation of pris-
oners in wartime should be contracted out at all. Though the private companies
hired by the U.S. Government were engaged in the interrogation of detainees
and intelligence-gathering,'3 8 the limited supervision given to these private con-
tractors, and the abuse inflicted upon detainees by the employees of these firms,
dramatically highlights the human rights abuses that can occur in such contexts
by both public and private employees.
Article I of the United Nations Conventions Against Torture (CAT) and
other cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or punishment defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or men-
tal, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtain-
ing from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a
third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind,
when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering
arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.39
138. See generally Julian Borger, US Military in Torture Scandal: Use of Private Contractors in Iraqi
Jail Interrogations Highlighted by Inquiry into Abuse of Prisoners, THE GUARDIAN (London), Apr. 20,
2004, Guardian Home Pages at 1.
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The investigation into the Abu Ghraib scandal has, thus far, yielded a sub-
stantial number of possible human rights violations-extending from the use of
humiliation tactics (forcing detainees to stand naked, simulate sexual acts with
one another, be dragged around in chains like animals, etc.) to brutality, all of
which may constitute torture. 40
When granting government contracts to private firms for the regulation and
management of prisons, certain mechanisms must be in place to ensure that
human rights are upheld and abuses are kept to a minimum. Without adequate
measures to guarantee that private companies are accountable to the government,
the ambiguity as to who gives the orders can lead to situations like Abu Ghraib.
There is a question as to whom the private contractors working at Abu Ghraib an-
swered, if there even were persons to answer to.' 4' Owing to the somewhat uncer-
tain legal status of the private contractors, coupled with the confusion as to what
laws apply to them, holding private individuals responsible for human rights vio-
lations in circumstances like that of Abu Ghraib could be problematic.'42
Two recently released reports by independent commissions (hereinafter
Schlesinger and Fay) note various concerns and problems with the structuring of
direction and command with respect to Abu Ghraib' 43 These problems are only
made more severe by the use of private firms to conduct interrogations of the Iraqi
prisoners. Schlesinger elaborated upon Fay, noting that interrogators were not
properly trained. Owing to the absence of training, interrogators used their own
methods and practices, implementing original techniques that contributed to abu-
sive behavior.'44 The findings of the two independent commissions support the
140. See generally Borger,supra note 138.
141. See generally Joel Brinkley & James Glanz, Contractors in Sensitive Roles, Unchecked, N.Y.
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GUARDIAN (London), May 17, 2004, Guardian Home Pages at 4; James Rosen, Contractors Operate
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theory that with stronger administrative safeguards and better delegation of au-
thority, perhaps these types of violations could have been avoided.
While Schlesinger incorporated the offenses committed by the military and
civilian contractors into one general discussion, Fay specifically addressed the is-
sues and concerns raised by the contracting of private firms, especially CACI In-
ternational, Inc., the private firm obtained for interrogation and other
intelligence gathering purposes.'45 The report indicated that CACI employees,
hired for "numerous intelligence-related services" including "interrogator sup-
port," "screening cell support," "open source intelligence," and "special security
office," among others, were able to participate in the abusive tactics, in large part
because of the lack of administrative restraints.'46 Both commissions recognized
the need, at times, to employ private companies, specifically in "urgent" or
"emergency" situations, but also emphasized that:
The general policy of not contracting for intelligence functions
and services was designed in part to avoid many of the problems
that eventually developed at Abu Ghraib, i.e., the lack of over-
sight to insure that intelligence operations continued to fall within
the law and the authorized chain of command, as well as the gov-
ernment's ability to oversee contract operations.147
Fay further noted that if private contractors were necessary for interroga-
tion purposes, then there must be a carefully developed structure including tech-
nical requirements, personnel requirements, and training.14 1
These findings by Fay and Schlesinger, at a minimum, support the theory
that when granting government contracts in areas as sensitive as the mainte-
nance of prisons during wartime, where contractors have direct interaction with
detainees, administrative mechanisms ensuring accountability are essential to
preventing human rights violations and abuses. Both reports include specific
recommendations regarding what policies need to be implemented, should the
government have to resort to delegating responsibilities like interrogation and
intelligence gathering. Fay expressed serious concerns regarding the extent to
145. See FAY REPORT, supra note 143, at 48.
146. Id. at 48-49.
147. See id.
148. See id.
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which private firms were aware that they, too, must follow the requirements of
the Geneva Conventions, and develop their techniques accordingly, so as to up-
hold the law.
49
CONCLUSION
Privatization has been one of the primary forms of marketization in the
United States. Some might say that there is not a great tradeoff for democracy if
snow removal is shifted from a city garage to a private contractor or even if a
publicly operated prison is now managed by a for-profit, private corporation.
But the fact that such trends in management are driven by global processes as-
sures us that a larger transformation is underway. The connection between the
relatively minor example of snow removal and the more significant change in
approach to the management of prisons is in their common connection to global-
ization and the structural aspects of their insulation from the public.
Democracy involves and requires more than just market forces and out-
comes. It involves and requires more than representation and a chance to hold
public officials accountable through the ballot box.' 50 Legitimacy comes in many
forms and through many forums. Administrative law can facilitate the creation
of multiple forums for policy discussions to occur and, if necessary, politics to de-
velop if contractual obligations are not met or need to be revised. Focusing on
the democracy deficit brought about by globalization does not mean that only
traditional legitimacy arguments, so common in administrative law, are rele-
vant.' 51 In fact, there is a major difference between legitimacy concerns ex-
pressed in traditional public law terms and today's concerns with privatization.
We have moved from questions concerning the proper role of judges, as opposed
to legislators, when it comes to policymaking, to issues concerning whether
there will be any public input at all when we are dealing with private contrac-
tors. It is not just a connection with an elected official that matters. What matters
more are opportunities for interested individuals to have input in policymaking
processes, as well as the specific cases that may affect them.
149. Id. at 50.
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Beyond traditional notions of electoral accountability, democracy requires
the means by which issues can be drawn, information shared, and meaningful
politics created. Democracy involves multiple forums for values and views to be
expressed publicly on issues beyond those likely to be relevant to just an eco-
nomic conception of the problems at hand. Legitimacy requires more than a
process simply to check up on those in positions of responsibility to see if they are
doing their job. It also involves creating the kind of information necessary to un-
derstand the issues for a real debate to ensue and for new ideas to be suggested.
Administrative law can and should play an important role in making forums
available to consider and assess new approaches to issues, not only those consid-
ered by public agencies but by public-private hybrids as well. The public-private
distinction should not unduly shield decisionmaking processes from opportuni-
ties for participation and the articulation of values and points of view that enrich
our politics and, indeed, make meaningful political discussion possible.
Closely related to these democracy concerns are questions of citizenship.
Quite apart from the decisionmakers involved, how do we conceptualize those
affected by these decisions? In addition to being citizens, individuals are increas-
ingly treated as consumers, customers, and clients. Each of these labels-citizen,
customer-consumer, and client-carry different expectations with regard to in-
dividual and collective responsibility for the provision of services. At what point
does the convergence of market processes, private decisionmakers, and individ-
uals as consumers, customers, or clients actually undercut our ability as citizens
to engage in the broader kinds of participation necessary for a vibrant political
process? 52 It is important that the legal discourses triggered by the public-
private distinction do not undercut or mask the role that citizens need to play.
A third related set of issues for the new administrative law involves conflict
of interest concerns. The state centric aspects of traditional administrative law
have focused primarily only on public administrators. Regarding conflict ques-
tions, the law asks such questions as whether there is a personal economic interest
152. See HINDY LAUER SCHACTER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT OR REINVENTING OURSELVES 7-9
(1997).
550 ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.
tied to the decision involved,153 whether there is inappropriate ex parte"'5 contact,
or whether there is undue bias on the part of the decisionmaker. 55 Economic gain
is a particularly relevant criterion when applied to some forms of privatization,
such as those where the decisionmakers involved are chosen in part because of the
incentives provided by their duty to try to make a profit. Clearly, to obviate this
problem the parameters of the delegated task must be set forth with clarity.
Delegation-like doctrine requirements can and should surface in this context
since it can only be assumed that a private prison provider will want to carry out
its duties in as profitable a manner as possible. To assure that this does not include
trampling prisoners' rights, legislative and contractual detail is necessary. Such an
approach can thus eliminate a financial conflict by making clear the challenges the
contractor must meet before any profit is possible.
The province of administrative law is broad. It can and should involve the
application of public law values to private actors and the creation of informal ap-
proaches to ensure a multiplicity of voices are heard and that noneconomic, as
well as economic, issues are considered. In this way, human rights abuses may
not only come to light, but more importantly, may never occur at all.
153. See, e.g., Tummey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 532 (1927):
[Tlhe requirement of due process of law in judicial procedure is not satisfied by the
argument that men of the highest honor and the greatest self-sacrifice could carry it
on without danger of injustice. Every procedure which would offer a possible temp-
tation to the average man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to con-
vict the defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and
true between the State and the accused, denies the latter due process of law.
154. 5 U.S.C.S. § 557(d)(1)(B):
[N]o member of the body comprising the agency, administrative law judge, or other
employee who is or may reasonably be expected to be involved in the decisional pro-
cess of the proceeding, shall make or knowingly cause to be made to any interested
person outside the agency an ex parte communication relevant to the merits of the
proceeding.
155. See, e.g., United States Steel Workers of America v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
